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There are two clearly opposed camps on the issue of the source of 
linguistic intuitions that have been labelled competentionalist and 
ordinarist positions. Competentionalists believe and defend the 
view that linguistic intuitions have a special status and that 
linguistic competence is their source, while ordinarists believe and 
defend the view that linguistic intuitions do not have any special 
status and that they are not directly derived from linguistic 
competence. The crucial disagreement is primarily over the source 
of intuitions. The main question that is addressed in this paper is: 
Which are the data that competence provides for linguistic 
intuitions? I try to show that all the criticism mounted against the 
ordinarist are ill-founded. Competence is not the source of 
linguistic intuitions. Intuitions do not flow directly from 
competence. They are the secondary (immediate) reflections on 
primary performance. !
Keywords: linguistic intuitions, competence, central processor, 
language as skill !!!
Part I !
1. Introduction !
There has recently been an ongoing discussion among philosophers about 
the status and the source of linguistic intuitions. The discussion started at 
the annual IUC course “Philosophy of linguistics” and most of early 
contributions on this topic have been originally published in the Croatian  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Journal of Philosophy.  My paper here is envisioned as a long-standing 1
discussion about intuitions with Nenad Miščević especially since Nenad 
wrote a contribution on this topic in my Festschrift.  Since Nenad's and 2
my beliefs on this issue are opposed this is an appropriate occasion to 
continue this unfinished discussion.  Thus the best way to read my paper 3
is as an answer to Nenad's claims and arguments.  4
There are two clearly opposed camps on the issue of the source of 
linguistic intuitions and I will label them (after Nenad's suggestion) 
competentionalist (Chomskian) and ordinarist (Devittian) positions. 
Competentionalists believe and defend the view that linguistic intuitions 
have a special status and that linguistic competence is their source, while 
ordinarists believe and defend the view that linguistic intuitions do not 
have any special status and that they are not directly derived from 
linguistic competence. The crucial disagreement is primarily over the 
source of intuitions. The competentionalist's view is that the language 
faculty is the source. The intuitions are claimed to be, as Devitt likes to  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 See relevant papers in the References. The discussion from that time has expanded 1
greatly and I will throughout this paper try to refer to a number of some more recent 
publications relevant for my discussion. Interested reader can look at a rather massive 
literature on the subject in Schütze and Sprouse (2014), Maynes and Gross (2013), Gibson 
and Fedorenko (2013), Sprouse and Almeida (2013), Mortensen, K. (web 2013), Devitt 
(2012, 2013), Rey (2013), Weinberg et. al. (2012), Ludlow (2011), Gross and Culbertson 
(2011), Fitzgerald (2010), Textor (2009), Culbertson and Gross (2009), Cohnitz & 
Haggquist (eds). (2009), Wasow & Arnold (2005), Georgi (web 2005), Schütze (1996). 
 See Miščević (2009).2
 I will address Nenad Miščević by his first name. The reason for my informality is our 3
deep and enduring friendship. Nenad and I met for the first time a long time ago, in 1974 
to be precise, at the Faculty of Arts in Zadar. I arrived there a year before Nenad. We both 
left Zadar, Nenad in 1992, a year before I did. When we first met, a number of young 
colleagues were newly employed at the faculty; those were the times of lively and 
engaging intellectual talks and joyful meetings and dinners. I remember that Nenad asked 
me to come and give a talk to his philosophy students and thus I continued my graduate 
(side) interest in philosophical issues connected to linguistics. Twenty years have passed 
from the time we taught in Zadar and we both remember those days with fondness and 
great nostalgia. Unfortunately, during the civil war in Croatia, which we both spent 
mostly in the shelter in the university cellars, Nenad’s nationalistic-minded colleagues 
(the leading figure among them was dr. Jure Zovko from Zagreb) practically hounded him 
out of his post. Life did not treat me better. We both found refuge in Maribor thanks to 
prof. dr. Bojan Borstner, who at the time was dean of the Pedagogical Faculty and the 
head of the newly founded philosophy department. Nenad became spiritus movens of all 
our activities, which are just too numerous to mention. We mostly planned them during 
our weekly commute from Rijeka to Maribor in my car Leon. Nenad’s inexhaustible 
ideas, concern for his students, ideas for symposia, love for his colleagues, enthusiasm for 
all things beautiful, and above all his human breath and tolerance found in me, as his 
colleague and friend, a true follower. This article is written in honour of his 60th birthday 
with the dedication: Without Whom Nought.
 See Miščević (2006), (2009), and (2012).4
Which Are the Data That Competence Provides for Linguistic Intuitions?
put it: the voice of competence (VoC). The ordinarist rejects this view, 
arguing that although linguistic competence produces and supplies 
linguistic data (for example, the sentence: “Ann is beautiful”), it does not 
supply information about the data (Devitt 2008b, 680). In other words 
linguistic competence produces the data for linguistic intuitions but it 
does not yield linguistic intuitions themselves. To continue with our 
example, linguistic competence will produce the sentence “Ann is 
beautiful” but that same competence will not tell us that this is a proper 
English sentence. In other words, the informational content of intuitions 
(this is an OK sentence) does not flow directly from competence (says the 
ordinarist) but intuitions are “immediate and fairly unreflective empirical 
central-processor (CP) responses to linguistic phenomena” (Devitt 2006b, 
120). Thus while a competentionalist believes that the competence to use 
a language is essentially conjoined with the competence to make intuitive 
judgments about the language, the ordinarist vehemently rejects this tie, 
i.e., she claims that competence to use a language is not automatically to 
be associated with the competence to make intuitive judgments about the 
language. This is a general but at the same time core statement about the 
difference between a competentionalist and ordinarist and the views have 
to be presented in more details in order to see who might be/is right.  
What I want to do in this article is the following:  
1. In Part I, I briefly review some known, but controversial, facts about 
explanation of linguistic intuitions since I primarily want to concentrate 
on mostly one question; which is the following:  
2. Which are the data that competence provides for linguistic intuitions? 
Robert Matthews pressed this point at the 2008 Dubrovnik conference 
and said that the crucial question was: What is the relation of intuition 
data to competence?   5
3. I bring out arguments for the ordinarist's view by looking at Nenad's 
argumentation.  
4. In Part II, I offer further answers to Nenad's objections to my view.  6
So what does competence supply? Although a lot has been said and 
written on this issue I think it will be helpful to dwell into a more detailed 
story regarding the matter. I will do this by following and critically 
responding to Nenad's arguments which he offers in support of the 
competentionalist's view of the source of intuitions.  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 The paper was presented in Dubrovnik (2008) as “Linguistic Intuitions and Linguistic 5
Competence”, yet it has not been published.
 See Miščević (web) Miščević (2006), (2012) while for the discussion in Part II I refer to 6
Miščević (2012) which I summarize for the English speaking audience and then give my 
responses.
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2. Setting the scene - Why are linguistic intuitions the evidence? !
The standard explanation is that linguistic intuitions are thought to be 
good evidence for linguistic theory because the speaker derives them 
from a representation of the rules  of the language, a representation that 7
constitutes the speaker's linguistic competence. The derivation is a causal 
(and rational) process like a deduction. On this explanation, linguistic 
competence alone provides information about the linguistic facts; the 
intuitive judgements are, “the voice of competence“ (VoC). The speaker 
has a privileged access to facts about the language (Devitt 2006b, 96). 
Competence supplies judgements (intuitions) about the language.  8
The nonstandard explanation states that the rules are embodied somehow 
in a speaker without being represented. However, linguists and 
philosophers that subscribe to this view are still committed to the 
Cartesian view that intuitions are the voice of competence, i.e., to the 
view that speakers, simply in virtue of being competent, have information 
about the linguistic facts (Devitt 2006b, 96). 
To reiterate, the nonstandard explanation says that linguistic rules are not 
represented but embodied in a speaker. It is very likely that rules that are 
embodied but not represented govern our other activities like swimming, 
bicycle riding, running, typing, piano playing, and thinking. The crucial 
point stressed by the ordinarist is that there does not seem to be any direct 
path from any of these embodied rules to relevant beliefs. Why then 
suppose that there is such a path for linguistic beliefs? Why suppose that 
we can have privileged access to linguistic facts when we cannot to facts 
about these other activities? We do not have the beginnings of a positive 
answer to these questions and it seems unlikely that the future will bring 
answers, claims the ordinarist (Devitt 2006a, 506-7; 2006b, 118). This 
fact is very important for the argument that linguistic competence is not  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 See the excellent discussion of the possible difference between represented and 7
embodied rules in Pereplyotchik (2011).
 Here is one of the possible quotes: "Unconscious, information-bearing states of the 8
language faculty gives rise to conscious knowledge that is immediately reflected in the 
speaker's intuitive linguistic judgements" (Smith 2006, 443; also see p. 454). For general 
discussion about the nature of intuitions in linguistics see Schütze (1996). More on what 
kind of intuitions are at stake see Devitt (2010b, 836-839). In this respect I do not agree 
with Nenad’s definition of intuitions when he says: “The feeling, the belief-state and the 
judgment, and sometimes even the report (all of them, or at least some of them) are called 
‘intuition’; I will reserve the term for the first three of them” (Miščević on the web but see 
also 2006, 526, footnote 3 for a more elaborate distinction). This cannot be true since the 
feeling, belief-state and the judgment as three different things. Intuitions that are at stake 
here are immediate judgments and the reports of them. 
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the source of linguistic intuitions.  9
So is there a path from embodied rules to relevant beliefs? And if there is 
one what is it? Is the ordinarist right in her claim that linguistic 
competence gives us data but not the intuitions (judgments) about these 
data? I now want to look into what has been said about the source, and 
the data that this source provides, for linguistic intuitions. !
3. What data are supplied by linguistic competence? !
Within the present discussion one of the competentionalists who has tried 
to criticise the ordinarist on the issue of the source and data for linguistic 
intuitions is Nenad Miščević  and since Nenad (2006, 528) has supplied 10
a very useful picture of what might be going on in arguing against the 
ordinarist. I will use his argumentation and criticisms as a foil for going 
into more details concerning the question of the source of intuitions. 
Miščević has posited the following competentionalist flow-chart in order 
to show what kind of possible route is involved in arriving at linguistic 
intuitions. 
We have a competent speaker (let us call him Peter) and the question to  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simulation 
(or some similar 












 For a dissenting view and some arguments to the contrary see more recently Maynes & 9
Gross who try to show how causal etiology sheds light? on questions of cognitive 
architecture…”how consciously inaccessible subpersonal processes give rise to conscious 
states”… (2013, 714). See also Miščević’s suggestion: “It is not that the answer (of 
competence) bypasses the central processor, it is rather that the central processor adds 
nothing substantial. So there is no mystery, no problematic causal route around the central 
processor or behind its back. The central processor is perhaps the messenger, but the 
message is written by the competence” (2006, 548). Rey (2113) has so far a most worked 
out suggestion about structural descriptions being responsible for categorical perception 
of language and also for intuitions. Devitt (2013) has a long response to that suggestion.
 For other exchanges see Fitzgerald (2010); Textor (2009); Pietroski (2008). Also 10
Cohnitz & Haggquist (eds). 2009.
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be answered is what is happening during Peter’s arriving at his judgment 
about a particular sentence. Let us say he is judging the sentence: “Ann is 
beautiful.” The real problem is how to characterize and explain what is 
happening. What is Peter’s cognitive apparatus really doing? The 
competentionalist claims that it is mobilizing the particular competence, 
i.e. the same cognitive (re)source that produces or fails to produce 
sentences in real-life speaking. It is the competence itself that is doing the 
work (producing the sentence “Ann is beautiful” and judging that “Ann is 
beautiful” is an OK sentence), the central processor (stage 3), at best, just 
passively reports the verdict of the competence (which is the intuition 
core – immediate spontaneous verdict – OK verdict – occuring at stage 
2). 
The ordinarist, according to Nenad, has a different answer. The above 
chart appears as follows: 
So there is no stage two from the competentionalist chart, there is no 
spontaneous verdict of the competence itself, the so-called intuition 
core.  In order to determine who might be/is right, we have to discuss the 11
proposals following the flow-chart(s) stage by stage. I will mainly 
concentrate on stage 1 and the transition to stage 2. The crucial questions 
have to be resolved right at these stages.  
Let us say that both competentionalist and ordinarist agree that 
competence involves at least embodied and non-represented rules, and 
operates according to them. The crucial question is: What are the data? 
The sense of data here is the same as in primary linguistic data (pld). So 
the data provided by competence are linguistic expressions (and the 
experience of using them) and not any observational beliefs about those 
expressions, says the ordinarist. 
Let me call this a datum-stage in the process of producing linguistic 




(or some similar 







 Devitt (in correspondence ) does not agree that CP testing (stage 2 in ordinarist’s chart) 11
is on the subpersonal level. He says: “I don’t know quite what Nenad has in mind in 2 and 
doubt that it is part of my view. The only relevant thing going on at the subpersonal level 
is the processing.” 
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number of criticisms of ordinarist’s approach to data. I will look at most 
of those suggestions and criticisms and try to show that they are not 
successful. 
1. To start with it is not true that competentionalist and ordinarist are in 
agreement that the immediate answer of the competence is a datum for 
the central processor (CP).  Whether the answer is the datum is exactly 12
what is in question. There is no immediate answer of the competence 
(answer being stage 2 in the competentionalist flow-chart), says the 
ordinarist. The answer is not the datum. The answer is part of the central-
processor reflection on the datum (answer being stage 2 in the ordinarist 
flow-chart). We can take it as agreed by both sides that the first stage is a 
normal production of the sentence, i.e. the actual linguistic production 
(primary linguistic data -pld) by the competence, but then Nenad adds 
that the sentence is being rehearsed and analyzed by Ann’s competence 
(italics mine), which is not accepted by the ordinarist.  In other words, 13
Nenad is claiming that competence presumably comes out with some 
kind of answer, some Yes or No signal about the sentence, and he argues 
that this is the most important element, the core, of the final intuition. 
However, to repeat, what is agreed upon by both sides 
(competentionalist’s and ordinarist’s) is only that the first state/step is a 
linguistic production. The doubtful part in Nenad's interpretation is "…
and analyzed by Ann's competence." Obviously the parser in the 
competence has to “make decisions,” that is analyze in order to come out 
with a sentence that linguist usually presents in a tree-like diagram but 
that does NOT mean that the competence comes out "with some kind of 
answer, some yes or no signal" about the sentence. The nature of the 
parser is to go through the analysis and in doing this it has to "make 
decisions" in order to produce a sentence. There is no core (YES or NO) 
of the final intuition in this processing and production of strings done by 
the competence in the stage no. 1 as indicated on both charts. 
2. So what is the datum? The normal production is the datum, says the 
ordinarist. Normal production of an actual linguistic expression is number 
one on both flow charts. Ordinarist suports (for competentionalist’s an 
extreme) view that there is no answer at this stage, that competence just 
produces the sentence proposed, say “Visiting relatives can be boring,” 
or in our example “Ann is beautiful”. Competentionalist objects and says 
that this won’t suffice since this is not new datum at all. But why should 
there be new datum? If there is no simulation, there is no new datum, just 
the datum presented. The normal production gives/is the datum, i.e. the  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 Nenad says: “We also agree that the immediate answer is a datum for CP” (2009, 5) 12
(italics mine). 
 Rehearsing, or what Nenad also calls simulation or tentative production, is not 13
necessary though. See Devitt’s detailed and important discussion on this point in this 
issue. 
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datum is the output of language competence. In other words, the basic 
data for the linguist are that our speaker says such-and-such and means 
such-and-such by the given expression. There is no need for new datum. 
The datum, metaphorically speaking, “does not speak”, says the 
ordinarist, while the competentionalist thinks that the datum “does speak” 
in the sense that the datum is already the intuition. In other words, for a 
competentionalist intuition comes with the datum. I suppose this is why 
the competentionalist thinks that there has to be a new datum (in stage 1). 
The main hero for the ordinarist  is the central processing unit. CP has 14
access to the resulting output of a particular competence so, it does some 
reflection about the output, i.e., about the data provided by the 
competence. CP appeals to empirical evidence, the data, says the 
ordinarist. So it is not true, as competentionalist claims, that production 
itself yields the verdict (for example: “the sentence is not O.K., “the 
sentence is not to be said” or “the sentence is ambiguous”). It is the 
central processor that yields that verdict (and it decides: “I would not say 
this” or “the sentence is ambiguous”), claims the ordinarist. Thus I also 
do not agree with the following passage in Nenad’s characterization:  
So, how are Ann’s and John’s cognitive apparatuses arriving to the 
verdict? Following the lead from the Chomskian tradition, I would 
laim that it is mobilizing the particular competence, i.e. the same 
cognitive resource that produces or fails to produce similar 
sentences in real-life speaking.  It is the competence itself that is 
doing the work, the central processor at best just passively reports 
the verdict of the competence, which is the intuition. Dunja, 
together with Devitt, would claim that Ann’s and John’s 
apparatuses are mobilizing the cognitive resource that is normally 
in charge of understanding sentences”(emphasis mine) (2006, 
528). 
My objection is that  intuitions in the ordinarist view are not the same as 
the understanding of a sentence. The understanding of a sentence is part 
of competence, not part of the judgment in intuitions.  When the 15
ordinarist claims that the production of the datum does not say anything, 
she means that it does not say anything more than mere production of the 
linguistic string. Thus the competence does not supply the meta-linguistic 
information in the intuition.  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 Nenad invented a rather amusing rhyme: “For the ordinarist, competence is mere 14
impotence and the real professor is the central processor.”
 Thus in the same vein Fitzgerald insists: “We can’t help but hear the sounds of our 15
language as structured and meaningful hearing a sentence” (2010,148). One cannot but 
agree that this is true because linguistic competence mandates the way we hear sounds; 
whether it mandates our intuitions is a different question! And the ordinarist denies this. 
That it mandates our intuitions cannot be taken for granted since this is the core of the 
issue. See Devitt 2010a: 854-855.
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3. Another possible answer of what the datum might be has been put 
forward by the ordinarist.  The datum is the experience that the answer 16
is about. The experience, as made clear by the context, is the neural-
verbal behavior of producing or trying to produce the target string (Devitt 
2006c, 594). Firstly, objects the competentionalist, subpersonal 
experiences hopefully don’t have qualitative character, so the experience 
of producing the string is just the very producing. This seems a good 
objection if experience is taken to mean the experience of undergoing 
something (like experience of being in pain, or being in love). But 
experience here can (and should) be taken simply as going through the 
motion (experience) of producing and understanding sentences. It is like 
an experience analogous to the perceptual experience of hearing someone 
say something. In the case of linguistic competence it is the experience of 
“saying it to oneself”. This is what the ordinarist means when he says that 
there is just trying to say the sentence or string under examination, which 
deploys just the competence and then there is reflection. Experience of 
being competent is the evidence, i.e. data. So there is no talk about 
qualitative character of experiences at the subpersonal level.  17
4. The competentionalist continues with his criticism: Suppose 
competence thus produces the string, and the CP takes this producing as 
its datum; it is almost like CP watching the competence producing the 
string. The ordinarist’s reply to this interpretation is that CP cannot be 
watching the producing of the strings since CP has access only to the 
result of this production. So CP simply looks and passes judgement on 
the produced string. 
5. Another question that Nenad asks is: But what kind of information can 
this (i.e. watching the production) give to the CP? This is, however, a 
wrong question to ask because the ordinarist claims that competence does 
not give information. If it does not give information it is not appropriate 
to ask what kind of information it gives! 
6. The further criticism of the competentionalist is that linguistic rules are 
embodied in the competence, and not in the CP. CP is not a dedicated 
linguistic processor, but an all-purpose machine. So, mere following the 
toils of competence does not tell CP much. The answer of the ordinarist 
is: Of course not since CP, to start with, is not following the so-called 
toils of competence. CP has access to the results of those “toils” and then 
it reflects on them. Furthermore, and more importantly, CP is not passing  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 See Devitt’s answer to Nenad’s criticism in Devitt 2006c, 594, fn. 22. This was given in 16
the context of discussing the question whether person’s answer to the linguist’s question is 
the datum. See Devitt within this issue, too.
 Devitt (in correspondence) is not fully supportive of my argument here. He says: 17
“Don’t know about that. Isn’t there a qualitative character to all experience? E.g. to 
looking at green grass or white snow?” See also Devitt’s answer (in this issue) to Nenad 
concerning this point.
Dunja Jutronić
intuitional judgements about possible linguistic procedural rules but 
simply “looking” at linguistic strings or sentences and then judging. 
7. The competentionalist goes on and says “the competence has, or rather 
consists of procedural rules, so only it can decide whether the target 
string is acceptable” (Miščević 2009 web). Surely, competence would not 
be competence if it did not produce the target string. It consists of 
embodied procedural rules. The whole point is that competence produces 
the well-formed (or sometimes ill-formed) sentences, but the answer to 
the question: “Is this a well-formed string” is not given by the 
competence. Competence produces that string but does not pass a 
judgement about the well-formedness of the strings. The linguistic job is 
done by the competence. It gives, in Nenad’s favored words, “red or 
green light” to the (intuitive) production of the string but not the 
judgment about the string. This is exactly what the ordinarist is pointing 
out when he/she says that competence does not have a voice.  18!
4. Is language a cognitive skill? !
A very important presupposition for the argument that intuitions in 
linguistics do not have a special status and are not derived from linguistic 
competence is the belief that language is a cognitive skill. and that there 
is a strict parallelism between some other kinds of skills and the linguistic 
skill. The ordinarist says that there is this parallelism and the 
competentionalist has two reactions: Either 1. Language is not a skill, it is 
not an ability, not simply knowledge-how but it involves knowledge-that. 
Or 2. If he accepts that language is a skill he believes that this kind of 
skill has a special status. In other words, language is not like other skills. 
Thus if the competentionalist subscribes to the view that language is a 
skill (as Nenad does) then he believes that language is a special skill not 
similar to other skills. I will say a little bit more about this issue because 
it is immediately relevant for the issue in question, i.e., question about the 
source of linguistic intuitions. 
Why should one think that linguistic competence is just a skill or ability? 
Concisely, according to the ordinarist, it is because it has all the marks of 
one: it has limited plasticity; it is extraordinarily fast; the process of 
exercising it is unavailable to consciousness; once established, it is 
“automatic” with the result that it can be performed whilst attention is 
elsewhere (Devitt 2006b, 209-10). Why shouldn’t we suppose that in the 
case of linguistic competence, the skill involves knowledge-that? The 
argument that Devitt gives in a number of places  is that we should not 19
128
 See answer to the point no.1, p…. and also see further discussion in section 4. Also the 18
important distinction between intuitions and other linguistic usage in Devitt (2006b).
 See for example Devitt (2010a).19
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suppose this unless we have some powerful reasons for doing so. 
Otherwise the supposition seems gratuitous, and I fully agree.  Why 20
suppose that simply in virtue of being competent in a language a person 
must have propositional knowledge about the language? Furthermore, 
and relevant for linguistic intuitions, why suppose that speakers have this 
sort of “Cartesian” access to linguistic facts? Why not suppose, rather, the 
modest view that any knowledge of these facts that a speaker may have 
comes from ordinary empirical reflection on linguistic phenomena? 
The ordinarist presses the point about parallelism between skills and the 
language capacity taken as a skill. Studying and explaining the nature of 
linguistic competence should be the same as investigating the 
competence, for example, to play chess, to touch type or the competence 
to think. The same kind of parallelism applies to the investigation and 
explanation of linguistic intuitions. In the cases of intuitions about touch 
typing, chess moves, and logical thought, a person can find data to have 
intuitions about without going out and looking because her competence 
produces relevant data. The ordinarist (rightfully) points out that 
linguistic intuitions are not somehow unique in comparison to these other 
intuitions just mentioned. On the other hand, the crucial thought of a 
competentionalist is that a speaker’s linguistic intuitions are different not 
only from the intuitions that we have about worldly things (like intuitions 
about mountains, or stones, or cats) but linguistic intuitions are also 
different from the intuitions about other human skills that are the inner 
products, the products of the person’s own competence, like thinking, and 
let me add running, or piano playing. I want to show that 
competentionalist is wrong regarding this point, too. I will try to show 
that there is there is parallelism between human skills like touch typing, 
piano playing and language skill. The competentionalist denies this. The 
parallelism does not hold, he says. I quote: “With skills, there is 
something to be said for the flow-chart proposed. (Ordinarist) has a /
good/ point here.  Take touch typing. The immediate product of the first 21
stage is a real (or imagined) movement of fingers. The movement itself is 
not an intuition. In the language case, the immediate product is already a 
judgment, so it is a candidate for being an intuition. And its content can 
be literally preserved all the way to the end of the process (stage no. 4). It 
is as simple as that” (Nenad 2006, 529, italics in the original). 
But simply asserting that the immediate product of linguisic competence 
is a judgment does not make it into one! On the contrary a production of 
a sentence (stage 1 on the flow-charts) is much akin to a tentative 
movement of fingers of the touch typist, or for that matter, of a piano  
129
 See Jutronić (1994). 20
 The flow chart is ordinarist’s flow chart. Nenad says: “Let me note that the case of 21
skills and the typist example are intermediary between studying completely mind-
independent items (like dogs) and studying once own inner production(s)” (2006, 531).
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player or runner’s positioning of her legs and body. The speaker produces 
the sentence just as a piano player hits the white and black keys and as a 
runner moves her legs. Just as the competent pianist’s movements of her 
fingers is not simultaneously the judgement of the same movements so 
the production of a sentence by a competent speaker is not 
simultaneously the judgement of this production. Furthermore there is 
also a similarity in their awareness upon reflection. A speaker is aware of 
(recognizes) a correct or incorrect sentence just as much as a piano player 
is aware of (recognizes) the production of a correct or incorrect tone 
(note) or a runner of a good or bad positioning of her feet and body. I do 
not see any crucial difference at all. In case of piano playing or running 
the datum is how a pianist plays or how a runner runs. In case of 
linguistic competence it is how a speaker speaks. 
Moreover, the belief that the immediate product of the first stage is a real 
(or imagined) movement of fingers in the case of touch typing but it is 
not in the case of the production of a sentence is the result of a confusion, 
the result of posing a wrong question. Let me explain: Nenad approvingly 
speaks about ordinarist’s flow chart for motor skills (in this case of typing 
skill). There is no analogy for linguistic skills, he claims. It is true, he 
says, that intuitive judgments about touch typing provides a nice example 
of reflecting on the output of one’s own competence. As Devitt has 
described it: “Ask a touch typist whether a ‘k’ should be typed with a 
middle finger and, very likely, he will think to himself, “How would I 
type a ‘k’?” He will attend as he goes through the actual or mental 
motions of doing so and respond immediately, “Yes.” (2006b, 107). The 
only datum here, ordinarist says, is “how he, a good touch typist, types.” 
So, by going through the movement, the typist secures the information 
for his CP: that it is the middle finger that has to be moved. So the datum 
is something like: middle-finger-move. The competentionalist alerts us to 
notice the role of the datum: it basically answers the question whether a 
‘k’ should be typed with a middle finger. (The CP has only to translate it 
into a suitable natural language formulation). If we want to take the 
analogy seriously, says competentionalist, we should ask in the linguistic 
example: which datum fixes the answer concerning the well-formedness 
of “They want to be teacher”? The only datum that can do this has to be a 
‘yes’ or a ‘no’. To put it slightly more technically: “The question to the 
typist has the form of “whether we φ?” and the answering datum is 
producing and instance of φ-ing itself. The question put to Ann has the 
form: Is S correct?, and the answering datum has to contain the answer, 
i.e. a ‘yes’ or a ‘no’. The question “Is S correct?” cannot be answered by 
merely reproducing S. The analogy thus speaks in favor of the view 
according to which the competence provides the core datum, the 
essential, central part of the intuition to be produced” (Nenad 2009, web). 
But the analogy as presented by the competetionalist does not hold 
because the question posed to the typist is: “How should we type (touch-  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-type) a ‘k’?” and the question posed to Ann is: “Is S correct?” Questions 
are not equivalent! They are two different kinds of questions. In other 
words, the question to the typist is about the performance and the 
question to Ann is about correctness. Let us take a piano player. You can 
ask her how she plays and you can ask her about the correctness of her 
playing. These are two different questions. My claim is that the answer to 
the same kind of question would give the same kind of answer. The 
datum for the typist would be a move of the middle-finger, the datum for 
a pianist would be maybe playing a scale and the datum for the speaker 
would be producing a sentence. The intuition/judgement whether any of 
this is correct would not come from the datum but from the answer to the 
datum: The typist would say: Yes, it has to be the middle finger, the 
pianist would say: Yes, the scale has to be played in this way and the 
speaker would say: Yes, the sentence is good. Or put slightly differently 
to bring out the analogy, one has to ask the following questions: “Is it 
correct to type a ‘k’ with the middle finger?”; “Is it correct to say S?” The 
data here are: action of typing ‘k’; action of saying S, playing the scale. 
Intuitive judgement is arrived at in each case by reflecting on such data. 
Thus there is no disanalogy between linguistic and motor skills, nor the 
disanalogy of the relevant intuitions. Competentionalist is in the wrong.  
In sum, all the objections boil down to the wrong conclusion that 
competence is doing something and deciding about its own doings at the 
same time. For example, if competence produced a correct string it also 
says: Look this is a correct string! In other words, competence produces 
its own data and passes a judgement on them. The ordinarist denies this 
in his claim that “(s)omeone who has the relevant competence has ready 
access to a great deal of data that are to be explained. She does not have 
to go out and look for data because her competence produces 
them” (Devitt 2010, 253). But that does not mean that her passing 
judgements or making conclusions “flows” from her own production. 
When a piano player plays she does not at the same time judges her 
performance. To exaggerate a bit, it is after the performance that she 
contemplates which were good or bad notes, phrasing, etc. If she were 
judging while performing, she would very likely fail to perform. 
The competentionalist, on the other hand, claims that competence is 
producing the language (speaking and understanding) and also telling us 
something about the language. But these two things are different things 
and this is the main claim of the ordinarist. Often these judgments will be 
immediate and unreflective enough to count as intuitions. Even when 
they do count, they are still laden with such background “theory” she 
acquired in getting her concept of grammaticality.  But nevertheless, 22
very importantly, “the grammatical (…) options that feature in these  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judgments are not supplied by the competence but by the central 
processor as a result of thought about language” (Devitt 2006b, 110 -11). 
The same with the piano player and/or with the runner in their respective 
intuitive judgements. There is no difference, thus the competentionalist 
loses. !
5. Conclusion to Part I !
One of the main contentions between a competentionalist and an 
ordinarist is about the issue of what competence supplies. Competence is 
a state, and as a state it does not give us conclusion about that state, says 
the ordinarist. The data are in the competence but the conclusions about 
the data do not flow from the competence itself. In other words, 
information about it is not in it. Competence produces language, says the 
ordinarist, it gives us more, says the competentionalist. 
Psychologists talking about linguistic intuitions say: “It is obvious that 
intuitive judgements are metalinguistic judgements. The object of a 
judgement of grammaticality such as the sentence “John lives in town” is 
good English is a linguistic object (the sentence S), and the judgement is 
made on it as a linguistic object” (Levelt 1974, 8). It is as simple as that. 
Or more to the point: “…the linguist or informant who considers the 
grammaticality of a sentence tries to imagine an actual situation of 
“primary” performance in order to decide whether the sentence “could be 
said”, i. e. is grammatical. Intuitions would then be secondary refections 
of primary performance” (Levelt 1972, 22). Levelt also points out that 
“there is a complete absence of arguments in the literature in favor of the 
thesis that linguistic intuitions reveal the underlying linguistic 
competence” (1972, 23), and thus stressing that, contrary to the 
competentionalist’s belief, intuitions do not flow directly from 
competence. One could go on citing but this should suffice.  The fact 23
that the output of competence are sentences, and intuitions are 
judgements made on those sentences is exactly what psychologists and 
ordinarists claim. Competentionalist is wrong because “linguistic 
intuiting is a kind of behavior, rather than a clairvoyant window on 
linguistic competence” (Levelt 1972, 33).  
132
 One more quote from Levelt et al. :"Linguistic intuitions became the royal way into an 23
understanding of the competence which underlies all linguistic performance. However, if 
such a linguistic competence exists at all, i.e.. some relatively autonomous mental 
capacity for language, linguistic intuitions seem to be the least obvious data on which to 
base the study of its structure. They are derived and are rather artificial psycholinguistic 
phenomena which develop late in language acquisition . . . and are very dependent on 
explicit teaching and instruction. They cannot be compared with primary language use 
such as speaking and listening (italics mine). The empirical domain of Chomskian 
linguistics is linguistic intuitions. The relation between these intuitions and man's capacity 
for language, however, is highly obscure" (1977, 89).
Which Are the Data That Competence Provides for Linguistic Intuitions?
Part II !
1. Introduction !
My discussion with Nenad as just presented was published in the 
Croatian version of the book dedicated to Nenad’s work as a 
philosopher.  Nenad responded to all those who participated in the 24
volume, myself included, and in his reply gave additional support to his 
view about the source of linguistic intuitions. I summarize his arguments 
and present my additional answers to his criticisms. I again try to show 
that additional arguments are ill-placed.  
In support to his view of intuitions as “spokesperson of competence” 
Nenad offers a colorful comparison. I summarize what he argues for: 
Intuition transfers the information that is in competence just as a 
spokesperson does, often interpreting a bit the information or adapting it 
for some present interest. Intuition is a voice of competence just as the 
spokesperson of, for example, Police department is "the voice" by which 
the department addresses its citizens. The behavior and the words of 
policemen present the department's policies, just as our ordinary language 
practice, and language corpus, indicate the functioning of the 
competence. But the spokesperson's statements (announcements) are 
often more direct, easier and more reliable way to what some 
department's policies are than the behavior of individual policemen. The 
same way intuitions are a shortcut to the functioning of competence 
(2012, 194).  25
My answer is the following: Spokesperson indicates how the office 
functions. It does not past judgments on the workings or decision of the 
office. Thus this is an invalid comparison because all it shows is how 
office (equaling competence) functions not how judgements follow from 
the office (competence). In Nenad’s own words: Intuitions are a shortcut 
to the functioning of competence. But pure functioning of competence is 
not in question. The question (to repeat) is: Does competence give us 
judgements about its own workings? Now, as it was stressed in the first 
part of this paper, the nature of the parser is to go through the analysis 
 and in doing this it has to "make decisions” in order to come out with a 
sentence, but that does not entail that is coming out with the intuition 
about the sentence The same way the spokesperson is not commenting on 
the police reports, she is just passing them on – showing how the police 
functions. Thus contrary to Nenad’s claim his own comparison supports  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ordinarist’s and not competentionalist’s view of the functioning of 
linguistic competence (police department)! 
Nenad continues: Imagine now that we have something very similar 
concerning our most general way we cope with objects and events (also 
our movement in space in relation to time dimension). In such cases our 
general ontological (geometric and temporal) intuitions will also be 
spokespersons of those abilities that enable us to cope in such a  way in 
the world (2012, 194). 
I think that comparision with geometric and temporal intuitions is worse 
than the previous one just presented. Nenad does not have a good analogy 
here, either. Think of our movement in space, or coping with objects and 
events. We walk, bicycle, swim, run. All of these acts are governed by 
embodied rules that amount to our competencies in these activities. Yet, 
in fact, these competencies do not provide us with much in the way of 
reliable intuitions at all. In other words, rules that are embodied but not 
represented govern our swimming, bicycle riding, running, typing, piano 
playing (or our way of coping with objects, or movement in space).  We 26
are coping in a certain way in the world, this is how we are functioning - 
and our intuitions about this functioning do not come from pure 
functioning itself. The crucial point stressed by the ordinarist is that there 
does not seem to be any direct path from any of these embodied rules to 
relevant judgements of beliefs. Therefore, the question that has to be 
answered is: What could possibly be a direct route from these embodied 
rules to the intuitions?  
In other words:  
1. Is there a path from embodied rules to relevant beliefs?  
2. If there is one what is it?  27!
7.Two arguments against the ordinarist !
In his answers Nenad presents two arguments against my view. He labels 
the arguments: 1. Argument from pure production and 2. Argument from 
interpretation. 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1. Argument from pure production !
Back to the essential question: Is competence the source of information 
which is the basis of intuitions? Here Nenad offers an additional 
interesting comparison in support of his view of the workings of 
competence. This is what I call “litmus comparison” where Nenad argues 
for the following: Let us see how we would react in simple cases, for 
example, in the case of ordinary litmus. Imagine two situations. In the 
first, minimal one, we have litmus paper. I dip it into the liquid and it 
displays red color. Question: Did the litmus provide the information? The 
commonsense answer is positive. Information about redness travelled 
from litmus to my eye to the back part of my brain and then further on. 
Of course, the direct information is only about redness.  The fact that the 28
liquid is acid is a further point, it is my own interpretation. Dunja would 
have to claim here that the litmus does not give information. The data is 
in it but the information is not. But what is data that is transfered if not 
information? (Miščević 2012, 194-195) 
Let us ask ourselves: What is the purpose (job) of litmus? How does 
litmus function? The job of litmus is to show color (red) just as the job of 
competence is to produce sentences (the language usage). Thus Nenad 
begs the question to suppose its job is more than that. The so-called 
information that Nenad mentions in litmus case is simply the mere 
workings of litmus just as the so-called information of competence is to 
produce sentences. Just as you cannot but hear the words of your 
language in the same way you cannot but see red in the case of litmus. 
The second situation presented by Nenad is the following: We have an 
instrument that reads off the color of the litmus. If the color is red if spits 
out the info ACID, if blue then ALCALINE, if violet NEUTRAL. This 
instrument gives the information which is probably comparable to 
language intuitions. Maybe the linguistic ability just gives the minimal 
answers like ACCEPTANCE/NOT ACCEPTANCE of the given sentence. 
The rest is happening in the subsequent stage and includes some kind of 
reader/interpreter (2012, 195). 
But was not the first case (the litmus showing the red color) presented 
above the case of the intuition in Nenad's sense!? Or this is what Nenad 
calls “intuition core” (in his chart on p. 6). Now the second mention of 
intuitions must be something additional? 
The instrument-reader is interpretation (in Nenad's chart labelled 
intuition). In the case of ordinarist this instrument is like central processor 
and it delivers information (acceptance, non-acceptance, ambiguity, etc.).  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It is the central processor that is analogous to instrument in yielding 
information (acid, alcaline, neutral). It can be seen as an instrument for 
detecting grammatical properties; in litmus’ case for chemical properties. 
Nenad insists: But would we not say in the presented case that the main 
source of information is litmus? Litmus “recognises” the content of the 
liquid; the rest is the interpretation. Analogously if somebody told you: 
The message is the voice of litmus, would you understand and also accept 
the metaphor? (2012, 195) 
My comment is: No, there is a confusion here between data and 
information, or if you want to put it differently between data and the 
conclusion from the data. The litmus responds to the liquid (datum) by 
signaling acid (conclusion from the datum); we respond to a linguistic 
string (datum) by signaling acceptable/grammatical (conclusion from the 
datum). And once again, the litmus’s job is to react to the liquid (this is 
data). If it did not react it would not be litmus. Thus the competence 
would not be competence if it did not have its role in producing (and 
understanding) of sentences. I conclude that one can accept the metaphor 
but one has to interpret it the right way. 
Nenad further continues: Let us assume that the person successfully 
produces the sentence. Is not that success like the information about the 
color of litmus? My answer is: Yes, sure it is—but this is part of the 
production—either of litmus or of competence—which does not carry 
with it any judgement! It is primary performance in anybody’s view. “If 
the sentence is succesfully used in primary use, says Nenad, then it is 
probably all right (probably because mistakes are possible but that is not 
in question). Intuition comes later” (2012, 195). But it was just claimed 
that intuitions come with production and now it is claimed that they come 
later! Something has gone wrong with the comparison with litmus! It 
seems that the argument now presented by Nenad is ordinarist’s and not 
competentionalist’s argument! Turning red is in some way like producing 
a sentence. The additional instrument would be a window into the 
reaction of litmus because the instrument (to keep the story going) is 
reflecting the doings of the litmus just like the central processor is 
reflecting upon the use of the sentence (but this is all happening in stage 2 
in ordinarist’s chart). 
Nenad asks again: “But is it not true that the primary use carries primary 
information about the fact that the sentence is OK? And does not that 
information flow (come) from competence?” (2012, 195) My answer is : 
No, it does not. Whether competence says sentence is OK is the question 
under discussion! There is a lot of “intuitive” processing in sentence 
production, of what Levelt calls “primary performance” but the reflection 
that sentence is OK is not part of primary performance. Primary 
performance is just what the words say: performance and thus not the 
conclusion about the performance. Nenad has not proved his point.  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2. Argument from interpretation !
A competentionalist compared (Nenad in conversation and now in 
writing) the state of competence to a photo. A photo gives us data but it 
also gives us conclusions from the data at the same time, says the 
competentionalist.  
For example, if the photo in the newspapers depicts two middle-aged men 
touching a rather young girl these are the data. But there is immediate 
information that the photo carries with those data (i.e. conclusion from 
the data), says the competentionalist, the photo also reveals that the two 
men must be pedophiles. The same goes for competence. It gives us data 
and information (conclusion) about the data at the same time (the 
sentence is OK). 
But the presented interpretation and the conclusion about the photo 
cannot be true because the scene (the data) can be given many 
interpretations and these interpretations are not given in the data. Thus 
the so-called information is actually a reflection on the data. That the men 
are pedophiles is the conclusion. But they could be a gay couple who 
have just adopted a child and want to show their affection. In other 
words, there could be different conclusions of the data. Even if we would 
accept that the data and the information are in the photo (or in the 
competence) the information about the photo or about competence is not 
in the photo or in the competence. The argument is wrong-headed 
because it confuses the object of the talk with the talk about the object. 
But Nenad insists: “I stay with my proposed example, it is good that 
Dunja brought it up. Let us suppose that this is really a case of a pair of 
pedophiles. Then the photo is the main source of information.” (2012, 
196). My immediate comment is that we are here at the stage when we 
are trying to decide if that is the case. Thus Nenad is presupposing that 
the two men are pedophiles and he should not.  29
The second argument from interpretation refers to my own research. 
Nenad says the following: When Dunja questions the inhabitants from 
Split about their dialect, she starts with their “intuitions” (2012, 197). To 
start with: I do not, I definitely do not! One of the leading ideas in 
sociolinguistics is the advice and firm belief not to use intuitions since 
they are very often false and unreliable.   30
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Indeed my work (and sociolinguistic investigations in general) stresses 
usage as prime evidence and not intuitions. My work (and any 
sociolinguist’s research) is an example of how we can get away from 
relying on intuitions. So what have I tested in my investigation of Split 
vernacular today? Not intuitions of older and younger people from Split 
as Nenad says but the usage, i.e. the use of the dialect by different 
generations in the attempt to find out what is left of the dialect among the 
youngest generation. To quote one of the more recent statements by 
sociolinguist Taliagmore concerning methodology: “Therefore, instead of 
asking the question: “How do you say X?” as a linguist might, a 
sociolinguist is more likely not to ask a question at all. The sociolinguist 
will just let you talk about whatever you want to talk about and listen for 
all the ways you say X” (2005, 5).  
However even if I did test the intuitions of Split inhabitants, this would 
be irrelevant for the present topic which is not about the use of intuitions 
but about the source of intuitions, a totally different question. In other 
words, the question is: Is the source of Stipe's intuitions that one should 
say “bija san” (“I was” instead of standard Croatian “bio sam”) a 
reflection on his own usage or did his competence tell him that directly. I 
would say (if I asked him) that he reflected on his own usage and this is 
exactly what the ordinarist is claiming. His answer did not flow from his 
competence but from the fast judgment coming out as a result of the 
central proccesing device (CP). 
Let us look at Nenad’s chart again:  
Nenad says: This is why in my scheme that Dunja kindly offers I left the 
space in 3. In stage 3 something came from outside, for example, the 
influence of school. The window into the intuitions became blurred. 
I said something about this chart in the first part of this article but now I 
think I have some additional comments to give. First how do we have 
empirical testing at a sub-personal level? All that was mentioned above 
about Stipe and family seems very much on the personal level, “the 
influence of school”, etc. But then if that is true how do we have intuition  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in stage 4. Intuition as described here seems conscious reflections 
affected by outside interference. Nenad actually explains saying that if he 
is right what we are left with is the claim in stage 2, intuition core which 
is simply kept stable up to the so-called (misnamed) intuition. I think this 
is actually how Nenad sees it, the intuitional spontaneous verdict (yes or 
no) is the main and only voice of competence.  I think it might be wise to 
change the labels in stage 3 and 4.  31!
3. Conclusion !
In conclusion to his answers Nenad poses a question: “Why is all 
this important for the philosophical methodology?” (2012, 198). I 
summarize his answer: Because we can in a very similar way explain 
variations in philosophical intuitions. Suppose you question people about 
the ship of Theseus: which of the two present ships, one which is still in 
function, let us call it presently functioning or the reconstructed one is 
identical with the original ship? Most of the people say, one presently in 
function. But the art historian chooses the reconstructed. If you slowly 
redo the old church in which the service is still held, this for us is not the 
same building. If, after bombardment, you take the broken remains and 
build the building with the original stones then it is the same building. 
This is how it was done from Zadar to Freiburg and nobody talks about 
the disappearance of old buildings. The same holds for the ship. Ship in 
function made from the totally new material is not one that was originally 
there while the reconstructed ship is. 
Nenad continues: Thus we can say the following: the opinion of the 
majority in favor of the presently floating ship reflects our deep 
understanding of the identity of the material objects through time. The 
intuition of the art historian is infected with specific interest of the art 
historians just as in our second example the intuition of the young one 
from Split is infected with the influence of school (2012, 198). 
True indeed but it does not help in solving the problem discussed – what 
is the source of intuitions? In the case of common folk (any human in 
general) the intuition can partly come from innate predisposition (created 
empirically through ages of humankind) or through intuitive reflection on 
their own experience. The intuitions of art historians have the same 
source as common folk but they also have additional intuitions, obviously 
“infected” by education. Nenad’s argument only shows that art historians 
are better indicators in judging historical buildings and people is less 
reliable, just as folk is in judging the grammaticality of sentences is less 
reliable than linguists are.  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In conclusion, Nenad has not convinced me in any of his comparisons 
and analogies. I stay with Timothy Williamson (2007) who believes that 
what are called ‘intuitions’ in philosophy are just applications of our 
ordinary capacities for judgement. The same can be said of language 
intuitions. Or with Jaakko Hintikka when he says: “What I am against are 
the reifications and mystifications surrounding both philosophers' and 
laymen's ideas about intuitions.... They do not carry any automatic 
justification with them, no matter how convincing they may be 
subjectively. All told, the unavoidably unconscious nature of intuitions is 
nothing but a pernicious myth we should get rid of.” (1999, 146).* !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
* This is a much elaborated (and hopefully improved) version of the 
original paper delivered at the IUC Philosophy of linguistic conference in 
2009 and at a number of meetings of analytical philosophy group in 
Maribor. My thanks to all the participants at the conference and my dear 
colleagues in Maribor. I am specially grateful to Michael Devitt who read 
the final version of this paper and pointed to unclarities and gave useful 
suggestions. If it were not for endless discussions with Nenad (mostly 
during our weekly trips to Maribor) this paper would never have seen the 
light. So all the glory to him!  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